Abstract We model and compare the bargaining process between a purchaser of health services, such as a health authority, and a provider (the hospital) in three plausible scenarios: (a) activity bargaining: the purchaser sets the price and activity (number of patients treated) is bargained between the purchaser and the provider; (b) price bargaining: the price is bargained between the purchaser and the provider, but activity is chosen unilaterally by the provider; (c) efficient bargaining: price and activity are simultaneously bargained between the purchaser and the provider. We show that: (1) if the bargaining power of the purchaser is high (low), efficient bargaining leads to higher (lower) activity and purchaser's utility, and lower (higher) prices and provider's utility compared to price bargaining. (2) In activity bargaining, prices are lowest, the purchaser's utility is highest and the provider's utility is lowest; activity is generally lowest, but higher than in price bargaining for high bargaining power of the purchaser. (3) If the purchaser has higher bargaining power, this reduces prices and activity in price bargaining, it reduces prices but increases activity in activity bargaining, and it reduces prices but has no effect on activity in efficient bargaining.
Introduction
Prospective payment systems are used widely to remunerate health care providers. In the hospital sector, they usually take the form of Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) pricing or similar methods, such as Healthcare Resource Groups (HRGs) in the United Kingdom or Group Homogenes de Maladie (GMC) in France. Depending on the institutional context, purchasers and providers (i.e. hospitals) bargain on price, activity (i.e. numbers of patients treated), or both. For example, in the US, Health care Maintenance Organisations (HMOs) or private health insurers bargain with hospitals on price, and seldom the number of patients treated, i.e. activity [2, 6] . In the United Kingdom, public purchasers (i.e. Health Authorities and Primary Care Trusts) have been negotiating price and number of patients treated (i.e. activity) with hospitals (known in England as NHS Trusts) under ''cost and volume'' or ''sophisticated'' contracts. The government has in more recent years implemented a policy known as ''Payment by Results'', where prices are regulated, but activity is negotiated between the purchaser (i.e. the Primary Care Trust) and the hospital (i.e. the NHS Trust). In the future, prices may be allowed to vary again. Within the Medicare Programme in the US, prices are nominally chosen by the purchaser (the government), while activity is either chosen or bargained with the provider: the price decided by the government could be seen as the outcome of a bargaining process between the government and the hospital association. Similar arrangements exist throughout Europe [15, pp. 243-245, 20 , ch. 1].
Although we observe a substantial amount of bargaining between purchasers and providers, the theoretical literature on the relative merits of hospital prospective payment systems normally assumes that payers are able to set the prices unilaterally, while hospitals choose the amount of quality and cost-containment effort, and in cases the number of patients treated (see, for example, [8, 9, 11, 21, 25, 26, 34] ). This implies that purchasers have all the bargaining power, which is a simplifying assumption, as the empirical evidence suggests that providers may hold at least some of it. Propper [32] shows that, in England, purchasers with higher bargaining power could secure lower prices. Brooks et al. [6] estimate that US hospitals hold on average 65% of the bargaining power when negotiating with private insurers. Melnick et al. [24] find a negative association between purchasers with greater market shares and prices charged by the providers.
This study models the bargaining process between a purchaser of health services (a public or private insurer) and a provider (a hospital) in three plausible institutional settings. Under these three settings we always refer, for short, to ''activity'' as the total number of patients treated by a representative hospital. We refer to the ''price'' as the monetary converter which translates a DRG with a weight equal to one into money (US dollars, British pounds, etc):
(a) the purchaser sets the price (stage 1), and the activity is bargained between the purchaser and the provider (stage 2): activity bargaining. This scenario corresponds for example to the current arrangements under ''Payment by Results'' in England. The government sets the price, but the activity is negotiated between the Primary Care Trust and the hospital. (b) The price is bargained between the purchaser and the provider (stage 1), and the activity is chosen unilaterally by the provider (stage 2): price bargaining. This scenario corresponds for example to the case of an HMO, which bargains on the price with the hospital, but the activity (i.e. patients treated) is chosen by the hospital. This model could also be applied to Medicare if we interpret the price set by the government each year to pay hospitals as the result of the negotiations between Medicare and a hospital association. In England, the government has recently discussed the possibility of moving to a setting where the prices is negotiated between individual hospitals and local purchasers, on the grounds that this may reflect more accurately the costs of the hospital (though ultimately it was not adopted). (c) Price and activity are bargained simultaneously between the purchaser and the provider: efficient bargaining. This scenario corresponds for example to the old arrangements in England under ''cost and volume'' or ''sophisticated'' contracts'' where Health Authorities and Primary Care Trusts have been negotiating price and number of patients treated (i.e. activity) with hospitals.
The first two models (activity and price bargaining) are two-stage models. For both models, prices are decided before activity takes place. This is a reasonable assumption. Prices are normally set at the beginning of each fiscal year, before the hospitals start to treat the patients. In the third model (efficient bargaining), both prices and activity are decided at the beginning of the financial year, and the model has then one stage only. Our main objective is to compare prices, activity and the utility of provider and purchaser in each of the three different institutional settings. We obtain the following key results.
The key result from the analysis is that if purchasers can set prices (activity bargaining), purchaser' utility, which is given by the net consumer welfare (patient benefit, net of transfer to the provider), is highest. This result holds for any level of bargaining power of the purchaser. The analysis therefore supports policies such as ''payment by results'' in the UK or DRG type of payments across Europe, where prices are fixed by the purchaser or the regulator. This result holds despite the fact that total surplus, i.e. the sum of purchaser's and provider's utility, is not maximised (the surplus is instead highest under efficient bargaining).
A second key analytical result is that if the bargaining power of the purchaser is low, efficient bargaining leads to higher prices and provider's utility, and lower activity and purchaser's utility, compared to price bargaining. This result seems surprising, as one would expect the purchaser to be better off when she can bargain with more instruments, i.e. both price and activity. However, this intuition holds true only if the bargaining power of the purchaser is high. If her bargaining power is low, having more instruments is counterproductive. One policy implication is that purchasers with low bargaining power may be better off if restricted to bargaining on prices only, and not on price and activity.
A third counter-intuitive result, which may be important for policy, is that by shifting from efficient and price bargaining (as in ''cost and volume'' or ''sophisticated'' contracts) to activity bargaining (as in ''payment by results''), the level of activity is likely to decrease. More precisely, this study predicts that moving from efficient to activity bargaining will certainly reduce activity. This is in contrast to what is normally thought, i.e. that ''payment by results'' will encourage activity. When moving from price to activity bargaining, activity will decrease (increase) if the bargaining power of the purchaser is low (high). These results are consistent with recent empirical evidence [14] which shows that the introduction of ''payment by results'' in England did not lead to any significant increase in activity.
This study contributes to the literature on purchaserprovider bargaining in healthcare (see [2] , for a survey). Ellis and McGuire [13] develop a model in which patients and doctors bargain about the intensity of treatment, and derive the optimal combination of patient's insurance and reimbursement for the provider which maximises consumer welfare. 1 The focus is on deriving the intensity of treatment under different demand and supply side arrangements. There is no comparison with other types of bargaining. Barros and Martinez-Giralt [3] show that, when bargaining with providers, purchasers may prefer to bargain with a professional association rather than a subset of more efficient providers. They focus on price bargaining and ignore the other types of bargaining considered in this study. Barros and Martinez-Giralt [5] analyse a bargaining process in which the purchaser can choose whether to negotiate with each provider separately or jointly, or announce a contract that any provider is free to sign (the ''any willing provider'' clause). They show that if the total surplus is high, the purchaser prefers the system of ''any willing provider'', but if it is low she prefers either joint or separate negotiations. Again, the focus is on price bargaining. GalOr [16] shows that purchasers (private insurers) might be willing to sign exclusive contracts with a subset of providers in order to secure more favourable terms during bargaining. Gal-Or [17] studies whether vertical mergers between hospitals and physician practices might enhance their bargaining power with the insurers (see also [18] ). Barros and Martinez-Giralt [4] explore the implications of the coexistence of a public and a private sector in the provision of health services. They argue that the public sector might choose to hold idle capacity in order to extract more beneficial conditions when bargaining with the private sector for the provision of services. There are other applications of bargaining in the health economics literature. Clark [10] examines how to divide a budget between two patients with different health conditions and capacity to benefit. Pecorino [31] models the effects of drug reimports from Canada on the profitability of US domestic pharmaceutical companies. 2 With the exception of the model by Ellis and McGuire [13] , most of the existing studies focus on price bargaining. Our main departure and contribution to the literature is to compare different types of bargaining models. The solution under price bargaining is qualitatively analogous to those obtained in the cited papers. The added value of our analysis consists in considering within the same set-up other forms of bargaining (activity and efficient) in addition to price bargaining, to compare them and to link the different regimes to different institutional arrangements.
Some of the bargaining models presented below can be interpreted as reduced forms of more complex institutional bargaining arrangements between (public or private) purchasing entities and associations (or organisations) of private providers. A more detailed analysis of such arrangements would quickly become intractable within the current set up and are therefore outside the scope of this study.
The study is organised as follows. ''The model'' presents the model. ''Regime comparison'' provides a comparison of the different scenarios. ''Adding quality and effort'' extends the model by adding quality and cost-containment effort. ''Extension'' further extends the basic model by endogenising the bargaining power of the purchaser and the provider. ''Conclusions'' offers concluding remarks and policy implications.
The model
We model the bargaining process between a purchaser of health services, such as a health authority, and a provider (a hospital). Define y as the number of patients treated and p as the price the provider receives for each patient treated. The provider's utility U is given by its surplus U(p, y) = py -C(y), where C(y) is the cost function of the provider, which satisfies C y [ 0, C yy [ 0 (increasing marginal cost).
The purchaser's utility (or health authority utility) is given by the difference between the benefit for the patients B(y) and the transfer to the provider: V(p, y) = B(y) -py. The benefit function satisfies B y [ 0 and B yy B 0.
A more general objective function for the purchaser is B y ð Þ À ð1 þ kÞpy þ dU, where k is the opportunity cost of public funds and d is the weight attached to the utility of the provider. The main results of the analysis with this more general specification would be qualitatively similar as long as either k [ 0 or d \ 1. This is because a positive 1 Dor and Watson [12] evaluate how different payment mechanisms affect the incentives in the relationship between hospitals and physicians. 2 See also Wright [35] for a model of price regulation in the pharmaceutical sector where the regulator and the pharmaceutical company bargain over a subsidy.
Bargaining and the provision of health services 393 opportunity cost of public funds k simply implies a higher marginal cost for the purchaser. The weight assigned to the utility of the purchaser needs to be strictly less than one (when k = 0), otherwise paying a higher price to the hospital leaves the purchaser's utility unchanged: the loss from a higher price paid is exactly offset by the higher revenues and utility of the provider. If d \ 1 higher transfers to the provider reduce the utility of the purchaser, which generates a tension between the purchaser and the provider. For expositional simplicity, we focus on the special case where k = d = 0. We analyse three plausible scenarios.
(1) Activity bargaining: the purchaser sets the price (stage 1), and activity is bargained between the purchaser and the provider (stage 2). (2) Price bargaining: the price is bargained between the purchaser and the provider (stage 1), but activity is chosen by the provider (stage 2). (3) Efficient bargaining: price and activity are bargained simultaneously between the purchaser and the provider.
Note that under scenarios (1) and (2) prices are determined before activity. This assumption is in line with the institutional setting of several countries (see ''Introduction''). Prices are determined or agreed before the activity takes place, i.e. before the hospital begins to treat the patients. For example, prices are determined at the beginning of the financial year, while activity (i.e. the number of patients treated) is determined during the financial year (i.e. after the resources allocation mechanism has been determined). In this respect, prices is a longer term decision compared to activity.
Define c, with 0 B c B 1, as the bargaining power of the purchaser, (1 -c) as the bargaining power of the provider, V and U as the outside options for the purchaser and the provider respectively, and e
), where i = a, p, e denotes respectively activity, price and efficient bargaining. In all the sections below we use Nash bargaining to solve for optimal conditions [19, [27] [28] [29] . 3 
Activity bargaining
In the first scenario, we assume that first the purchaser chooses the price (stage 1), then the purchaser and the provider bargain on activity (stage 2). 4 We solve by backward induction. For a given price p, the bargained activity can be determined by solving:
The first order condition (FOC) is:
(See section The model in the Appendix for proof). To interpret the optimal condition on the bargained activity it is useful to characterise the solution on the basis of the price level. We distinguish three possible cases. The first (special) case is such that the price is b p ¼ B y ðyÞ ¼ C y ðyÞ, i.e. the price corresponds to the level where the marginal benefit crosses the marginal cost. In such a case, the optimal activity desired by the purchaser ðb p ¼ B y ðyÞÞ is equal to the activity desired by the provider ðb p ¼ C y ðyÞÞ. The equilibrium level of activity is such that B y (y a ) = C y (y a ). The second case arises when p\b p which we refer to as the ''low'' price. In this case we have that B y (y a ) [ p and C y (y a ) [ p, i.e. the desired activity for the purchaser is higher than the desired activity for the provider. The bargained activity lies somewhere between the desired activity of the two parties. The LHS of Eq. 2 is the net marginal benefit of activity for the purchaser, weighted by her utility and her bargaining power. The RHS is the net marginal cost for the provider, also weighted by his utility and his bargaining power.
The third case arises when p [ b p which we refer to as the ''high'' price. In this case we have that p [ B y (y a ) and p [ C y (y a ), i.e. the desired activity for the purchaser is lower than the desired activity for the provider. The FOC can be rewritten as
Again, the bargained activity lies between the desired activity of the two parties. We impose an upper bound on the price:
, then the price is so high that the desired activity for the purchaser is zero. Therefore, the equilibrium activity is characterised for any level of price between zero and an upper bound p. Figure 1 illustrates different bargained activity levels [y a (p)] for three different values of the bargaining power of the purchaser, equal to 0.3, 0.5 and 0.7, respectively. In equilibrium it is always the case that e U ! 0 and e V ! 0, so that the equilibrium lies in the area between the average and marginal benefit, and the area between the average and marginal cost.
Finally if p = B y (y a ) = C y (y a ) (i.e. where the marginal benefit curve crosses the marginal cost curve), there is no disagreement between purchaser and provider, so that y a is such that B y = C y . 3 The Nash bargaining solution has been used extensively in labour economics to examine negotiations between trade unions and firms with respect to wages and employment. See, for example, Oswald [30] for a survey of the literature, and Manning [22] , McDonald and Solow [23] , Sampson [33] and Bulkley and Myles [7] . 4 A different interpretation is that the Department of Health fixes the price, then the Health Authority and provider bargain on activity. The implicit assumption is that the Department of Health and the Health Authority share the same objective function.
By differentiating Eq. 2 with respect to c we obtain
. If the price is low, a higher bargaining power of the purchaser increases activity ð The effect of a change of price on activity is:
which in general is indeterminate. According to our assumptions, it is always the case that C y [ C/y and B/y [ B y , since the marginal cost is higher than the average cost, and the average benefit is higher than the marginal benefit. For low levels of p the provider utility e U is low (and the purchaser utility e V is high) so that
Similarly, for high levels of p the purchaser utility e V is low (and the provider utility e U is high) so that oy a op \0 for low p. This result is consistent with the example shown in Fig. 1 .
The above analysis holds for a given price. The purchaser chooses the price to maximise: The FOC is:
The optimal price is determined such that the marginal benefit of higher activity equals the marginal cost. The SOC is: B yy y p 2 ? B y y pp -2y p -py pp . Dividing both terms of Eq. 5 by y p , straightforward manipulations lead to
where y p ¼ y p p=y is the elasticity of activity with respect to price. The optimal price is such that the marginal benefit from activity is equal to the price, weighted by the inverse of the elasticity of activity with respect to price: a higher elasticity implies a lower marginal cost from an increase in price, as intuitive.
Price bargaining
In the second scenario, we assume that first the purchaser and the provider bargain on price (stage 1), then activity is chosen unilaterally by the provider (stage 2). 5 By backward induction, for a given price, the hospital chooses the level of activity which maximises U = py -C(y), leading to the FOC: 
Thanks to the envelope theorem, U p = y p (p). The FOC for the bargained price is:
(See section The model in the Appendix for proof). The LHS of Eq. 8 is the benefit from a marginal increase in price, and includes the marginal benefit for the purchaser from a higher activity (weighted by her bargaining power, her utility and the responsiveness of supply), and the marginal benefit for the provider from a higher surplus (also weighted by his bargaining power and utility). The RHS is the cost for the purchaser from a marginal increase in price and an overall higher transfer (also weighted).
If the purchaser holds all the bargaining power (c = 1), the optimal price is such that: B y y p = y ? py p . If the provider holds all the bargaining power (c = 0), the optimal price is the highest possible compatible with the purchaser having a non-negative utility. The bargained price is an intermediate level between these two extremes.
Efficient bargaining
In the third scenario, purchaser and provider bargain simultaneously on activity and price. This setting is called efficient bargaining, because it reduces the potential for unexplored opportunities from mutual gain. 6 The bargaining problem is: 5 This setup is analogous to the model of bargaining between a firm and a union over wage and employment [22, 23] , where the firm sets the employment, but the wage is bargained with the union. 6 The outcome achieved in price bargaining is not efficient. As remarked by Aronsson et al. [1] , ''there are unexplored profits and/or utility gains from bargaining''.
After obtaining the FOCs and re-arranging, we obtain:
(See section The model in the Appendix for proof). The negotiated level of activity maximises the sum of the surplus for the purchaser and for the provider U ? V = B(y) -C(y). In this respect the level of activity is efficient. The optimal price is a weighted average of the average cost of the provider and the average benefit for the patients. 7 If the purchaser holds all the bargaining power (c = 1), the price is equal to the average cost: the purchaser extracts all the surplus from the provider. If the provider holds all the bargaining power (c = 0), the price is equal to the average benefit: the provider extracts all the surplus from the purchaser.
Regime comparison

Constant marginal benefit
To gain some insights into how the different scenarios relate to each other, we consider the following functional forms: (a) the benefit function is linear in activity: B(y) = ay; (b) the cost function is quadratic: CðyÞ ¼ The equilibrium for the three scenarios is reported in Table 1 (See section Constant marginal benefit in the Appendix for proof).
The following proposition compares prices, activity and utility under different regimes.
(See section Constant marginal benefit in the Appendix for proof). The price in efficient bargaining is equal to the price in price bargaining, which is higher than or equal to the price in activity bargaining. Compared to activity bargaining, under both price and efficient bargaining, the purchaser cannot set the price unilaterally but will have to negotiate it with the provider. Since, in general, higher price reduces the utility of the purchaser, the purchaser will set a lower price when this can be decided unilaterally as opposed to when it has to be negotiated (in which case the provider will use some of the bargaining power to get a better deal).
The activity in efficient bargaining is the highest. The activity in price bargaining is higher than in activitybargaining when the bargaining power of the purchaser is below 0.59. Under efficient bargaining the activity is chosen such that the marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost, regardless of the bargained price. Under price bargaining the activity is chosen unilaterally by the provider. Since the bargained price is strictly below the marginal (and average) benefit, and the activity is chosen such that the price is equal to the marginal cost, it follows that activity will be below the point where marginal benefit and cost are equal. The result follows. Under activity bargaining, the price chosen by the purchaser is set at relatively low levels to keep payments to the provider low, which in turn implies that the activity that the purchaser can negotiate in return is lower compared to the efficient one (where marginal benefit crosses the marginal cost).
The purchaser weakly prefers activity bargaining to efficient bargaining, and efficient bargaining to price bargaining. Since prices are lowest under activity bargaining, the purchaser is better off under this scenario despite the activity being lower compared to efficient bargaining. Under price bargaining, activity is lower (which reduces purchaser's utility) compared to efficient bargaining while prices are the same. Therefore, in this case it is the lower activity that drives the lower purchaser's payoff under price as opposed to efficient bargaining. The results and intuition are reversed from the provider's perspective: the provider weakly prefers price bargaining to efficient bargaining, and prefers efficient bargaining to activity bargaining.
Total surplus S, defined as the sum of provider's and purchaser's utility (U ? V), is highest under efficient bargaining. This is not surprising as, by definition, efficient 7 This result is in line with the model of employment-wage bargaining analysed by Manning [22] in the context of firm-union negotiations. The level of employment does not depend on the payoffs of firm and union. Consequently, they ''can agree on this level and then bargain about the distribution of the rents'' ( [22] , p. 131).
bargaining is the procedure that maximises total surplus (purchaser's plus provider's surplus). More interestingly, both activity and price bargaining are inefficient, in the sense that they do not maximise total surplus. Proposition 1 shows that the comparison between activity and price bargaining is in general indeterminate: however, if the bargaining power is below 0.59 then the surplus is higher under price bargaining. The intuition for the result is the following. Total surplus is maximised at y e = a/c where the marginal benefit crosses the marginal cost. Activity is always too low under activity and price bargaining because y e C {y p ;y a } so that the marginal benefit is strictly above the marginal cost. Whether the surplus is highest under activity or price bargaining depends on whether activity is highest in either of the two regimes. But, as already discussed, activity is highest under price bargaining compared to activity bargaining only for sufficiently high bargaining power. The result follows.
One implication of our results is that if the provider could choose between different bargaining regimes, the provider would choose price bargaining, while the purchaser would choose activity bargaining. Note that this is in contrast to the result that the total surplus (the sum of the surplus of provider and the purchaser) is highest under efficient bargaining. Therefore, both the provider and the purchaser would be willing to forego some of the total surplus in favour of a more inefficient bargaining procedure, which, however, maximises their own surplus. This result may not arise if side payments between the parties were costless and credible to make, in which case total surplus would be maximised as under efficient bargaining, and the surplus for provider and purchaser may be higher.
The results may help to explain some of the observed institutional settings. In England, for example, the government has moved from a system of ''cost and volume'' or ''sophisticated'' contracts'' (described in the Introduction), which is equivalent to efficient bargaining to a system of ''payment by results'', which is equivalent to activity bargaining. As shown in proposition 1, although this move increases the (public) purchaser's payoff, it reduces the provider's one and total surplus. This may be explained by the strong monopsony power of the government in England (being the only buyer of public services from public hospitals). The government has recently discussed the possibility of moving to price bargaining where the prices are negotiated between individual hospitals and local purchasers on the ground that this may reflect more accurately the costs of the hospital. Ultimately, price bargaining was not adopted in part because of the fear of (local) purchasers paying too high prices for care. Our model suggests that from the government perspective this was the most rationale choice, since activity bargaining under ''payment by results'' leads to a higher payoff than under price bargaining.
Many European countries make use of DRG-type of payments to remunerate hospitals (i.e. the equivalent of payment by results in England), which in our framework coincides with activity bargaining. This has become the dominant payment system. Our analysis suggests that such form of bargaining is, however, inefficient since it does not maximise total surplus (though it does maximises purchaser's one) and generates welfare losses. Table 1 shows that the welfare loss from having activity bargaining as opposed to efficient bargaining is equal to:
2 . 8 A move from activity to efficient bargaining is not interesting from the purchaser perspective. For the purchaser to gain from a move from activity to efficient bargaining would require hospitals to make side payments (say a positive lump-sum transfer) from the hospitals to the government. This is unlikely to happen as it is the purchaser who ''pays'' for services and not the other way around. The difficulty then of moving from activity to efficient bargaining may therefore lie in the credibility of making payments that go from the provider to the purchaser.
To summarise, the purchaser is better off under activity bargaining and the provider is better off in price bargaining. Activity and surplus is highest in efficient bargaining and prices are highest in efficient or price bargaining. Figure 2 below displays the solution under different regimes. An arrow indicates increasing bargaining power of the purchaser. In efficient bargaining, a higher bargaining power of the purchaser reduces prices but has no effect on the level of activity. In activity bargaining, higher bargaining power of the purchaser induces higher activity, but has no effect on prices. In price bargaining, higher bargaining power of the purchaser reduces both prices and activity.
Interestingly, the solution in price bargaining, where the purchaser holds all the bargaining power, coincides with the solution in activity bargaining, where the provider has all the bargaining power (point A). The solutions in price and efficient bargaining coincide when the provider holds all the bargaining power (point B). The solutions in activity and efficient bargaining coincide when the purchaser holds all the bargaining power (point C). Finally, the activity in price bargaining is higher than in activity bargaining only for low bargaining power of the purchaser. P c=0.5 respectively). Activity is highest in efficient bargaining and lowest in activity bargaining (point A c=0.5 ).
Decreasing marginal benefit
We extend the previous analysis, and assume a more general specification of the benefit function: BðyÞ ¼ ay À b 2 y 2 , with decreasing marginal benefit, while we maintain the other assumptions: Table 2 reports the solution in price and efficient bargaining. Proofs are in the Appendix (Decreasing marginal benefit). The solution for activity bargaining is more involved, and is derived separately in ''Decreasing marginal benefit and activity bargaining''. The following proposition compares the two regimes.
If the bargaining power of the purchaser is sufficiently high ðc [ b bþc Þ prices are higher in price bargaining, activity is lower, the provider is better off and the purchaser is worse off than under efficient bargaining. If the bargaining power of the purchaser is sufficiently low ðc\ increases with b and decreases with c. Note that if b = 0 we are back to the results of proposition 1. Therefore, if the purchaser has low bargaining power, efficient bargaining yields a lower utility for the purchaser than in price bargaining. This is a surprising result: we would expect the purchaser to be better off when she can bargain with more instruments, i.e. both prices and activity. But this holds true only if her bargaining power is high. If her bargaining power is low, having more instruments is counterproductive. The purchaser is better off when she cannot bargain on activity. Figure 3 below displays the solution under the two regimes. The solutions in efficient and price bargaining are depicted by line BC and AD respectively. An arrow indicates increasing bargaining power of the purchaser. As before, in efficient bargaining activity is constant, irrespective of the distribution of bargaining power, and the price decreases as the bargaining power of the purchaser increases. In price bargaining, both prices and activity decrease as the bargaining power of the purchaser increases.
It is useful to compare these results with those obtained in the previous section by assuming constant marginal benefit. When the bargaining power of the purchaser is low, the activity in efficient bargaining is lower than in price bargaining but with constant marginal benefit it is always higher.
If the marginal benefit is constant (and equal to the average benefit), the purchaser is always better off regardless of its bargaining power: this arises because activity is always higher under efficient bargaining than under price bargaining, while the price is the same. Activity under efficient bargaining is always determined such that the marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost. If the marginal benefit is strictly decreasing and the purchaser has low bargaining power, activity under price bargaining can be such that the marginal benefit is below the marginal cost (so that activity is higher than under efficient bargaining) but the average benefit is above the price, so that the purchaser's utility is positive. This cannot arise if the marginal (and average) benefit is constant: if the marginal benefit is below the cost, then the average benefit would also be below the price, which in turn would imply a negative utility for the purchaser: however, this can never arise under Nash Bargaining as both parties always have positive utilities in equilibrium. Therefore, the activity under price bargaining will be always lower than under efficient bargaining if the marginal benefit is constant.
Decreasing marginal benefit and activity bargaining
In this section we derive the solution under activity bargaining. For a given price, the optimal bargained activity is:
See section Decreasing marginal benefit and activity bargaining in the Appendix for the proof. The optimal price is given by the price which maximises V ¼ ay a ðpÞÀ b 2 y a ðpÞ 2 À py a ðpÞ. Given the complexity of the solution, it is not possible to derive manageable expressions for price and activity. To compare the solutions for the three scenarios we resort to numerical simulations. Our strategy is to specify a grid of values for all the parameters of the model (a, b, c and c), and compute the solution numerically. We fix a = 1, and specify a grid for b 2 f0; 0:5; 1; 1:5; . . .; 30g, c = {0, 0.5, 1, 1.5, … , 30} and c = {0, 0.1, … , 0.9, 1}.
For example, supposing that a = b = c = 1 and c = 0.5, then y a ðpÞ ¼ Overall, the numerical simulations suggest that in activity bargaining prices are lowest, the purchaser's utility is highest and the provider's utility is lowest (note the similarity with proposition 1). Activity is lower than in efficient bargaining. It is lower than in price bargaining when the bargaining power of the purchaser is below a certain threshold, which is between 0.7 and 0.95 in our simulations.
The solution in activity bargaining is displayed in Fig. 3 on the line AC, which was derived by plotting the numerical solution 1,000 times. In contrast to the solution with constant marginal benefit, in activity bargaining the price is no longer fixed. As the bargaining power of the purchaser increases, the price decreases and activity increases.
As in the previous section, the solution in price bargaining with c = 1 coincides with activity bargaining when c = 0 (point A), and the solution in activity and efficient bargaining coincide when c = 1 (point C). However, when c = 0 (points B and D) efficient and price bargaining yield different solutions. Finally, when both parties have the same bargaining power, the solutions in efficient bargaining and price bargaining coincide at the point where marginal cost equals marginal benefit.
Finally, in price bargaining, an increase in the bargaining power of the purchaser reduces prices and activity, but in activity bargaining it reduces prices but increases activity.
Adding quality and effort
In this section we extend the model by introducing quality and cost containment effort, and we show that the results using this more general specification are qualitatively similar to the ones obtained above. We follow the approach suggested by Ma [21] and Chalkley and Malcomson [9] . Define q as the quality generated by the provider and e as the cost-containment effort. The cost function of the provider is Cðy; q; eÞ þ uðy; q; eÞ. C includes the monetary cost, which increases with quality and activity but decreases with effort: C(y, q, e), with C y [ 0, C q [ 0 and
C e \ 0. u is the non-monetary cost, or disutility, which increases with activity, quality and effort: uðy; q; eÞ, with
We also assume that the demand for treatment depends positively on quality so that y = y(q) with y q [ 0. This assumption implies y = y(q) , q = q(y), q y [ 0. Therefore by contracting activity the purchaser can implicitly contract the level of quality. The benefit function of the patients is 
Activity bargaining
We assume that first the purchaser sets the price (stage 1); second, purchaser and provider bargain on activity (stage 2); third, the provider chooses effort (stage 3). We solve by backward induction. For a given price and activity (stage 3), the provider maximises the surplus U with respect to effort so that: U e ðe Ã Þ ¼ 0 : ÀC e ðy; qðyÞ; e Ã Þ ¼ u e ðy; qðyÞ; e Ã Þ ð 13Þ
The optimal effort for the provider e*(y) is such that the marginal benefit of lower cost is equal to the marginal disutility of effort. The indirect utility function of the provider is Uðp; y; qðyÞ; e Ã ðyÞÞ ¼ py À Cðy; qðyÞ; e Ã ðyÞÞ Àuðy; qðyÞ; e Ã ðyÞÞ. For a given price (stage 2), the activity bargaining problem between purchaser and provider is: 
whose FOC is:
The volume of activity is such that the difference between the marginal benefit and the price (weighted by the relevant factors) equals the difference between the marginal cost and the price (also weighted by the relevant factors). The condition is analogous to Eq. 2. However, the marginal benefit and marginal cost also include the additional benefit and cost from higher quality. The marginal cost includes both the monetary and nonmonetary cost.
In The FOC is:
The optimal price is such that the marginal benefit of higher activity and quality induced by a higher price is equal to the marginal cost.
Price bargaining
First the purchaser and the provider bargain on price (stage 1), and then the provider chooses the level of activity and cost-containment effort (stage 2). We solve by backward induction. For a given price (stage 2) the provider maximises the surplus U with respect to activity and effort, so that: The provider chooses the level of activity, which equates the price to the marginal monetary and nonmonetary cost. The marginal cost also takes into account the indirect effect of activity caused by increased quality, which is captured by the last term on the RHS. The optimal effort is such that the marginal benefit of lower cost is equal to the marginal disutility of effort. The indirect utility function of the provider is U(p, y*(p), q(y*(p)), e*(p)). 
The FOC is:
The optimal price is such that the weighted marginal benefit for the purchaser of higher activity and quality, plus the weighted marginal benefit for the provider in terms of higher surplus, is equal to the weighted marginal cost for the purchaser.
Efficient bargaining
First the purchaser and the provider bargain on price and activity (stage 1), then the provider chooses the cost-containment effort (stage 2). By backward induction, for a given activity and price (stage 2) the supplier maximises the surplus U with respect to effort,
which provides e*(y). 
The price equals the weighted sum of the average benefit for the purchaser and the average cost of the provider, which includes the non-monetary cost. The optimal activity balances the purchaser's marginal benefit with the provider's marginal cost.
Regime comparison
Suppose that the benefit and cost functions are separable in activity, quality and effort, and that demand is linearly increasing in quality: (a) Bðy; qÞ ¼ a 1 yÀ
(b) y = hq; Cðy; q; eÞ
2 Þ, and assume V ¼ 0 and
. Compare this formulation with ''Decreasing marginal benefit''. It is straightforward to show that all results contained in that section also hold for the more general formulation developed in ''Adding quality and effort''.
Intuitively, since activity is an increasing function of quality, by choosing or agreeing a certain level of activity, the provider also determines the level of quality. Therefore, adding quality adds complexity to the model but does not alter the main incentives. The only difference is that the marginal cost is now interpreted as the marginal cost of activity and quality; similarly, the marginal benefit includes the marginal benefit of activity and quality. For what concerns effort, since the provider is residual claimant in all the scenarios, effort is set such that marginal benefit from lower cost is equal to the marginal disutility of effort, regardless of the specific institutional setting. Therefore, also adding this variable does not alter the main results of the analysis.
Extension
In this section we assume that each party (i.e. the purchaser and the provider) can exert costly investments that can increase their bargaining power. 9 We assume that the bargaining power of the purchaser has the following linear specification: c = c 0 ? v -u, where v is the investment by the purchaser to increase his bargaining power, and u is the investment by the provider. Therefore, the bargaining power of the provider is 1 -c = 1 -c 0 -v ? u. Investment efforts are costly and are given by the function K(v) for the purchaser and k(u) for the provider, respectively. Investments are realised before the bargaining process begins (simultaneously and non-cooperatively). We also assume that such investments are wasteful: their only purpose is to increase the bargaining power but have no effect on patients' health. The purchaser's and provider's utility under each bargaining procedure i (and excluding the cost of investment efforts) is respectively equal to V(p which gives the optimality condition:
The marginal benefit from a higher investment, in terms of larger bargaining power (and a higher payoff in the bargaining stage) is equal to its marginal cost. Similarly, the maximisation problem for the provider is: from which we obtain:
A higher investment reduces c and increases the bargaining power of the provider and his utility, which is traded-off with its marginal cost. We now ask how the incentives to invest in such costly (but wasteful) investments to increase the bargaining power varies across the three regimes. We focus on the special case of proposition 1, which assumes constant marginal benefit. It is straightforward to obtain that , and lower in the other two cases. Therefore, the incentive to invest is highest when total surplus S is highest (and perhaps counter-intuitively it is not when the utility of the purchaser is highest).
For the provider we obtain:
3 . It follows again that the marginal benefit from increasing the bargaining power is highest under efficient bargaining , and lower in the other two cases. Therefore, the incentive to invest is highest when total surplus S is highest.
Note also that the marginal benefit from increasing the bargaining power is the same for the purchaser and provider under efficient bargaining, it is higher for the provider under price bargaining and it higher for the purchaser under activity bargaining. Suppose that the K(v) = k(v), ie the cost of the investment is the same for the purchaser and the provider. A key insight from this extension is that wasteful investments will be highest when the efficient bargaining procedure is used. We have shown above that total surplus is highest when the bargaining power is exogenous. As we show below this is not necessarily the case when the bargaining power is endogenous: since wasteful investments are higher under efficient bargaining, welfare defined as the surplus S minus the costly investments may be lower.
To make this point simply, we focus on efficient versus price bargaining. We normalise a = c = 1. We also assume that the cost function of the investments is quadratic: K(v) = zv 2 /2 and k(u) = zu 2 /2, and that c 0 = 0. Figure 4 illustrates the comparison between the two welfare functions for different values of the marginal cost of the investment z. The welfare under efficient and price bargaining is depicted with a red and a black line, respectively. When investments are costly, i.e. z is high, we recover the results obtained in the previous section. Welfare is higher under efficient bargaining: graphically, the red line is above the black one. When z is low, i.e. investments are not very costly, then both parties will engage in high levels of wasteful efforts that will increase significantly wasteless expenditure (the red line lies below the black one). Such expenditure is higher under efficient bargaining, because as shown above the marginal benefit from the investment is higher. For low levels of z, the latter effect is so strong that overall welfare is higher under price bargaining than under efficient bargaining. Finally, note that when z is very low, wasteful expenditure is so high that welfare is negative, and that efficient bargaining generates a higher welfare for z [ 5.05.
Conclusions
Different countries have different institutional and bargaining settings for purchasers and providers. They usually follow one of three scenarios: the purchaser first sets the price (stage 1), and activity is then bargained between purchaser and provider (stage 2): activity bargaining; the price is first bargained between purchaser and provider (stage 1), but activity is then chosen unilaterally by the provider (stage 2): price bargaining; and price and activity are bargained simultaneously between purchaser and provider: efficient bargaining. This study has compared prices, activity and the utility of provider and purchaser in each of the three different institutional settings. We obtain three main results: First, if the bargaining power of the purchaser is higher than a certain threshold and the marginal benefit of activity is strictly decreasing, efficient bargaining leads to higher activity and lower prices compared to price bargaining. As a consequence, the purchaser's utility is higher under efficient bargaining than under price bargaining, while provider's utility is lower. The results are reversed if the bargaining power of the purchaser is below a certain threshold: the activity is higher and the price are lower under price bargaining rather than efficient bargaining. Therefore, the purchaser's utility is higher under price bargaining than under efficient bargaining, while provider's utility is lower.
This result is surprising, as one would expect the purchaser to be better off when she can bargain with both instruments, price and activity. This intuition proves correct only when the bargaining power of the purchaser is high. When it is low, the purchaser would be better off contracting on prices only: having more instruments is not useful, and actually is counter-productive. This is because when the bargaining power of the purchaser is very low, the provider will bargain a very high price, which under price bargaining will be accompanied by a large volume of activity. In contrast the level of activity under efficient bargaining is always determined such that the marginal benefit of quantity is equal to the marginal cost, regardless of the price: therefore under efficient bargaining when the purchaser is weaker, she will pay a higher price without obtaining any extra activity.
Interestingly, the threshold level of bargaining power of the purchaser over which the purchaser is better off, depends critically on the shape of the marginal benefit curve. The threshold is higher when the marginal benefit function is steeper (i.e. the benefit function is more concave) and when the marginal cost function is flatter (i.e. the cost function is less convex).
Also, the threshold is strictly positive only when the marginal benefit of activity is decreasing: if the marginal benefit is constant (and equal to the average benefit), the purchaser is always better off regardless of its bargaining power (the threshold is zero in this case). Intuitively, this arises because if the marginal benefit is constant, activity is always higher under efficient bargaining than under price bargaining, while the price is the same.
Activity under efficient bargaining is always determined such that the marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost. If the marginal benefit is strictly decreasing and the purchaser has low bargaining power, activity under price bargaining can be such that the marginal benefit is below the marginal cost but the average benefit is above the price, so that the purchaser's utility is positive. If the marginal (and average) benefit is constant, having a level of activity such that the marginal benefit is below the marginal cost would imply that the average benefit is also below the price. But this would imply a negative utility for the purchaser, which can never arise as under Nash Bargaining both parties always end up with positive utilities. Therefore activity under price bargaining will be always lower than under efficient bargaining if the marginal benefit is constant.
Our second main result is that under activity bargaining, price and provider's utility are lowest and the purchaser's utility is highest. The level of activity in activity bargaining is always lower than in efficient bargaining. It is also lower than in price bargaining, but only if the bargaining power of the purchaser is below a certain threshold (which, according to our numerical simulations is above 50%). If the bargaining power of the purchaser is high, then the level of activity is higher under activity bargaining than under price bargaining.
Even if activity is generally lower under activity bargaining, the lower price more than compensates for the reduction in the benefit for the patients from the lower activity, so that the purchaser is overall better off. The analysis therefore supports policies such as ''payment by results'' in the UK, where prices are fixed by the purchaser or the regulator.
One perhaps less intuitive implication of our results is that by shifting from efficient and price bargaining (as in ''cost and volume'' or ''sophisticated'' contracts) to activity bargaining (as in ''payment by results''), the level of activity is likely to decrease. This is in contrast to what is normally thought, i.e. that ''payment by results'' will encourage activity. However, our results are consistent with recent empirical evidence [14] , which finds that the introduction of ''payment by results'' in 2003-2005 generally did not lead to any subsequent significant increase in the volume of activity in England.
Our third result is that under price bargaining, higher bargaining power of the purchaser reduces prices and activity; in activity bargaining it reduces prices, but increases activity; and in efficient bargaining it reduces prices but has no effect on activity. Therefore, when the bargaining power of the purchaser increases, price and activity move in the same direction under price bargaining but in opposite directions under activity bargaining.
The intuition for these results is the following. Under price bargaining, the optimal activity is chosen by the provider such that the price is equal to the marginal cost. Therefore, whenever the price increases, as a result of a stronger purchaser, activity follows. Under efficient bargaining, the optimal activity is such that it maximises the sum of the purchaser and provider utility. Since purchaser's utility is given by the benefit minus the transfer to the provider, while provider's utility is given by the transfer minus the cost, this is equivalent to maximise the difference between benefit and cost. The optimal activity is chosen such that the marginal benefit is equal to the marginal cost of activity, regardless of the bargaining power. Therefore, a stronger purchaser will obtain a lower price but not a lower activity. Under activity bargaining, a stronger purchaser is able to agree with the provider a higher volume of activity for a given price; if the marginal benefit of activity is decreasing, the higher agreed activity reduces the marginal benefit for the purchaser from fixing a higher price, so that the price is lower and activity is higher when the purchaser is stronger.
The above results are derived in ''The model'' and ''Regime comparison'' and focus on price and activity only. In Adding quality and effort we extended the analysis by adding quality and cost-containment effort as choice variables of the provider. This makes activity bargaining a three-stage model, and efficient and price bargaining a twostage model. Cost-containment effort is always decided by the provider in the last stage of the game as, realistically, effort takes place after the negotiation stage, i.e. the beginning of the financial year. We assume that demand responds positively to quality. Therefore, the quality decisions always happen when decisions on activity take place. This is because by committing or deciding on a certain level of activity, indirectly the provider commits as well to a certain level of quality.
We show that under this more general setting, the main results of the analysis in terms of regime comparison still hold. The only difference is that the marginal cost is now interpreted as the marginal cost and disutility of activity and quality; similarly, the marginal benefit includes the marginal benefit of activity and quality. For what concerns cost-containment effort, since the provider is residual claimant in the three different settings, effort is always set such that marginal benefit from lower cost is equal to the marginal disutility of effort, regardless of the institutional setting. Therefore, adding effort to the analysis does not alter the main results.
In ''Extension'' we show that, although welfare is higher under efficient bargaining for a given bargaining power, this may not be the case when bargaining power is endogenised and the marginal cost of wasteful effort is sufficiently low. This arises because the returns from wasteful investments are highest when the efficient bargaining procedure is used, so that welfare net of the wasteful investment may now be lower under efficient bargaining compared to the other bargaining procedures.
In terms of implications for future work, there is a need for empirical work that quantifies the bargaining power of the purchaser and the provider in health care markets. This might help governments to decide whether to encourage purchasers to bargain on prices only, or on price and activity simultaneously. Moreover, most of the empirical work focuses on the effect of bargaining power on prices [2] . This study provides clear predictions of the effect of the bargaining power on activity as well as price. More precisely, under price bargaining, a higher bargaining power of the purchaser reduces activity; under activity bargaining it increases activity; and under efficient bargaining it has no effect on activity. Future empirical work might test such predictions. We have also shown that a switch from efficient to price bargaining does not necessarily lead to an increase in activity. Further empirical work might test whether policies such as ''payment by results'' are likely to increase or decrease activity compared to previous policies. On the theory side, more work is needed which integrates bargaining models with politicaleconomy ones.
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